Introduction
The Sanctuary project at UCSD is building a secure infrastructure for mobile agents, and examining the fundamental security limits of such an infrastructure.
First, what do we mean by \secure"? An obvious issue is the privacy of computation. With standard approaches for agent-based systems, a malicious server has access to the complete internal state of an agent: software agents have no hopes of keeping cryptographic keys secret. 1 The privacy of computation is only one aspect of the security picture: the integrity of computation is perhaps more critical. In agent-based computing, most researchers have been concentrating on one side of the security issue: protecting the server from potentially malicious agents. Related work in downloadable executable content (Java [ 7 ] , Software Fault Isolation [19] , Proof-Carrying Code [16, 1 7 ] , OS extension mechanisms such as packet lters [13] , type safe languages [4, 9] , etc) all focus on this problem. The converse side of the agent security problem, however, is largely neglected and needs to be addressed: how d o w e protect agents from potentially malicious servers? Why should we believe that the result returned by our software agents are actually correct and have not been tampered with?
Software Agents and Malicious Servers
In agent-based computing, not only do servers fear that agents bring in viruses or attempt to subvert the server, but the agent's user also needs to be able to trust that the agent w as not subverted when visiting a series of servers, some of which m a y be malicious.
An simple example of how such a subversion might occur will make this problem clearer. Let's look at the standard air-fare agent scenario: I need to travel to Washington D.C. to attend a meeting, so I send a software agent to visit servers at all the airlines to query their databases to determine the least expensive airfare from San Diego to Washington D.C., subject to various trip timing, seat preference, and routing constraints. One of the airlines, Fly-By-Night Airlines, runs a server, www.flybynight.com, where my agent's code is automatically recognized and \brain-washed": its memory of what other airlines it has visited and what prices it had seen is modied, so that it ends up recommending a \red-eye" ight b y Fly-By-Night Airlines, when a less expensive daytime ight oered by another airline would really have been preferred. 1 Distributed function evaluation approaches may seem to apply, but that requires an unrealistic fault model and is not likely to be ever practical.
Partial Solutions / Preliminary Results
How can software agents be protected from malicious servers? This is a critical security problem to be solved if we are to have faith in agent-based computing. In the following sections, we will examine several approaches and discuss their limitations.
Legal Protection
One approach to the agent security problem is via legal/contractual means. Operators of the servers where agents run promise, via contractual guarantees, that they will keep their servers secure from external attackers and that they will not violate the privacy or integrity of the software agents' computation. No complex cryptographic protocols are required | there are no run-time overhead at all! Such an approach, however, is not entirely satisfactory: for it to work the ability to detect breaches of contract is still critical. Furthermore, for that detection to be meaningful, tamperproof logs must be available to serve as non-repudiable evidence of the breach of contract should lawsuits become necessary.
No Protection
For certain classes of computations, no protection is necessary, and if we are to carefully examine the cost/benets of providing protection for software agents, this must be examined. What types of computations require no protection? Suppose the result of the computation is easily veriable, e.g., the existence of an airfare that is below $200. In this scenario, agents may simply replicate and ood-ll all airline servers to make sure that a copy of the agent has run on each server, and each agent copy can send the corresponding ight information if it nds one that costs less than $200. No agent state needs to be transferred at all.
Fault Tolerance Approaches
In this section, we discuss fault-tolerance-style approaches to the agent security problem. First, we make some general observations on which aspects of agent state are vulnerable to attack, and which aspects may be systematically veried.
Observations
First, note that uncorrupted servers can determine whether agent code and read-only state have been modied: the originator of the software agent can digitally sign the agent code and all readonly conguration variables before dispatching the agent to agent servers, and the agent servers can verify both the origin and the integrity of these aspects of the agent. (Message authentication codes are inappropriate, since potentially malicious agent servers should not share secrets with the originator of the agent.) Other than cryptographic techniques (if any) needed for the secure communication links, for now w e will not require the servers to perform any cryptography.
It may seem that agent code signing could be circumvented by a malicious server, since the malicious server could tamper with the agent and then re-sign it with its own key. This approach, however, is thwarted by the following design: agents are constrained to send its results only to the entity that signed them. Thus, conceptually a server that re-signs an existing agent is simply performing two actions at once: denying service to the true originator of the agent, and sending out its own agent, possibly with initial data stolen from the \murdered" agent.
Next, note that the originator can specify the order in which the software agent will visit the airline servers. Abstractly, this is a circuit of the (complete) graph connecting the airline servers, and the originator may c hose this circuit at the time of agent dispatch.
At a n y honest server, the agent code and its read-only state is checked when the agent arrives, so if the malicious server tries to tamper with the agent code or the read-only state the malicious server can not successfully pass the modied agent to an honest server. (Alternatively, the agent code and the read-only state may be considered to be reloaded from the originator by e v ery server.) Furthermore, we assume that the variable agent state is transmitted among servers using authenticated and encrypted channels, so that only the server that is the intended migration target can receive the agent, as long as the agent is starting from an honest server. Thus, the malicious server can not intercept an agent as it migrates from an honest server to another server.
At a n y server, an agent m a y query the server's identity. A t rst glance, this identity could be authenticated via a public key certication chain, with the root certicate embedded as part of the read-only agent state. Note, however, that the use of cryptographic authentication does not really help a software agent to determine the hosting server's identity: since the server has control over the agent's computation, the malicious server may simply cause the program counter to bypass the cryptography-based identity query and force the program to take the conditional branch(es) which corresponds to the desired (falsied) server identity.
In addition to being able to ask for the identity of the current server, the agent m a y also ask from which server did the agent migrate. Because we assumed that server-to-server communications use authenticated and encrypted channels, servers will know from which server did an agent arrive. If the agent is running on an honest server, both these answers will be correct and they can be used to verify that the agent had migrated on an edge on the intended migration circuit; if the agent is running on the malicious server, these answers may be incorrect and the agent's state may be modied so that it believes it is running on a dierent server. In the special case where there is exactly one malicious server, this ruse will be discovered when the agent migrates o of this server to an honest server. If there are two or more malicious servers, the rst malicious server encountered by an agent can hand it o to any of the other malicious servers in the route the agent is programmed to take. When the agent is passed on to the next (honest) server, the agent i s brainwashed to believe it had visited all the servers in the original path between the two malicious servers, thus avoiding discovery. If software agents are t o d e p art from the route determined at agent dispatch time, such departures must start and end at a malicious server.
Now, consider what visiting a malicious server can do to a software agent's memory. The readwrite state variables of an agent m a y be completely altered by the malicious server; thus, an agent that has just left the malicious server can not trust any of its memory: All information collected prior to this point it time | including data from servers visited prior to visiting the malicious server | are suspect. Thus, only the results of computation done by those servers from the (maximal) honest sux of the agent's route, assuming that the computation is independent o f a n y input from previous servers, should be trusted.
Server Replication
In [15] , Minsky et. al. developed a general method for mobile agent computation security, marrying some ideas from the elds of fault tolerance and cryptography. They propose that servers should be replicated, and that replicated agents on these servers can use voting and secret sharing/resplitting to move from one phase of the computation to the next.
Unfortunately, the fault model assumed in the paper is completely unrealistic: it assumes that replicated servers fail independently. In our Fly-By-Night Airlines example, all replicated www.flybynight.com servers are under the administrative control of flybynight.com, and malicious attempts to brainwash software agents would occur on all of these servers. And while bribery of individual administrators of replicated servers by an outside adversary might be independent events, bribery of the software engineers responsible for the www.flybynight.com Web site is a much more likely scenario. Even if we assume that Fly-By-Night Airlines is trustworthy, replicated servers in the real world are likely to consist of identical hardware running copies of the same software: any security holes found by an external attacker that allows him/her to compromise one of the replicated servers is very likely to permit him/her to compromise all the servers.
Agent Replication
While the general approach proposed by Minsky et. al. fails to be convincing, in certain special cases the fault tolerance style of approach can solve or at least ameliorate the mobile agent security problem. Because server replication does not help to reduce the risk of agent brainwashing, in the following we will assume that there is only one server per administrative/security domain, or when there are multiple servers in a domain, they are indistinguishable.
Consider the case where there is at most one malicious server in our airfare minimization example. Assume that secure communication links exists between the servers, and that the users possess individual certied public keys; servers may use these keys to verify the origin of the software agents. (Secure communication channels may be constructed cryptographically if servers also possess cryptographic keys to authenticated and encrypted data among the parties as needed.) Because we are assuming that there is only one dishonest server, we know that the agent m ust stay on the circuit prescribed during agent conguration.
Suppose we c hose some sequence of servers S = s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n . W e congure two software agents A 1 and A 2 , where A 1 will travel along S, and A 2 will travel over S 1 = s n ; s n 1 ; : : : ; s 1 .
Recall that we are assuming at most one malicious server. The all-honest servers case is trivial, so we can ignore that case; henceforth we will assume that there is exactly one bad server. Without loss of generality, assume that server s i is malicious, and that s j is run by the airline with the lowest fare (j i). Furthermore, we assume that the malicious server will not attempt denial-of-service attack s | i t m a y d o s o b y killing the software agent o r b y implanting the belief that the lowest fare is oered by some third server which will later repudiate this idea.
First, consider the j < i case. A 1 will encounter the lowest-fare server (s j ) rst, and when it arrives at s i , its memory of the lowest-fare seen-so-far may be altered. When A 1 returns with its result, it will report either s i as the server with the lowest fare, or some s k where k > i if the malicious server did not declare a fare lower than one that the agent will see later in its travels.
A 2 , on the other hand, will encounter the lowest-fare server after visiting the malicious server. It will report the correct minimum price | since we assume no denial-of-service attacks, the corrupt server will not have made this agent believe that a (false) lower price exists elsewhere | and when A 2 returns to the user, the user will be able to determine the true minimum airfare.
Next, consider the j = i case. When this occurs, the malicious server can alter its price to be just below that of the second lowest price oered and still get business. This corresponds to a Vickery auction or second-price auction, 2 except the situation is upside-down: instead of the highest bidder paying the second highest bid price to obtain the goods being auctioned o, we h a v e the lowest airfare oer selling tickets at the second lowest quoted price. Note that Vickery-style 2 We do not have sealed bids here since the minimization is done by the agent; an alternative design would be to gather bids encrypted using the public key of the agent originator, preventing servers from knowing each other's prices directly. Of course, servers could send out their own agents to discover such \commodity" prices; this may have to be done through anonymizing proxies if the pricing could depend on the consumer's identity.
price determinations may be a desirable economic design choice anyway, since Vickery auctions are designed to maximize the ow of pricing information so bidders have no economic interest to hedge and not bid (and reveal) the true prices that they are willing to pay.
The above agent-replication approach provided a partial solution for a special case | at most one malicious server | the solution did not quite work \properly" to compute the true minimum airfare: when j = i, w e could only achieve second-best pricing, where what we obtain is the secondbest airfare minus . Arguably, since airline servers may also send out agents to determine pricing at other airlines | assuming price information can be obtained anonymously or in such a w a y that we are assured that it is independent of consumer identity (or race or age or ...) { Vickery pricing may be the end eect whenever there is great consumer price sensitivity i n a n y case. Applying some basic cryptographic techniques, however, we can do a little better.
Cryptographic Approaches
There are three cryptographic techniques that apply or may apply. The rst uses per-server digital signatures to vouchsafe partial results; the second is the use of state authentication codes to improve on the fault-tolerance solution above; and the third is the use of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP) (a.k.a. \holographic proofs") or computationally sound proofs (CS proofs) to show that the computation at the servers ran correctly. Note that these techniques deal with the integrity of the result of computations at various servers | if the privacy of the result is needed, the result can simply be encrypted using the originator's public key.
Digital Signatures
The application of digital signatures to mobile agents is to use the signatures to vouchsafe partial results from computation done while executing in a server. Going back to the airfare minimization example, what we will do is to have each airline server sign a message of the form \this is the best airfare found by y our software agent at this server at this time". 3 The message signature is done using the airline's key, so it is non-repudiable and unforgeable. The message may optionally be encrypted by the originator's public key to ensure privacy.
The key observation is this: due to the unforgeability property, a malicious server can not completely brainwash the agent | at worse, it can make the agent forget the lowest airfare, which will be detected when an enumeration of the signatures show that one airline's quote is missing.
By using digital signatures, we will either obtain the true minimum airfare or be able to detect any tampering with the agent. The cost is that the agent state grows linearly with the number of servers visited, where the fault-tolerance approach required constant space (though the result was Vickery pricing rather than true minimum). This is an acceptable overhead for most applications. Like the fault-tolerance approach, however, the digital signature approach is not fully general: it only applies only certain classes of functions where there are intermediate results that can be \compressed" (e.g., in this case, the intermediate result is the best price found on the serve r | w e don't care how m uch w ork was done in querying the airline's databases prior to nding this result, and we don't need to prove that it took place and that it ran correctly). 3 It is important to note that the query as well as the answer is signed and timestamped. Otherwise signed answers to the wrong question, asked by a dierent agent dispatched by the adversary, could be substituted in place of the expected answer.
Partial Result Authentication Codes
The idea of a Partial Result Authentication Code (PRAC) is very similar to that of a message authentication code (MAC)[2, 1 0 , 1 1 ]. Instead of authenticating the origins of a message, we are demonstrating the authenticity o f a n i n termediate agent state or partial result that resulted from running on a server. Similar to MACs, PRACs are cheaper than digital signatures to compute, and have slightly dierent security properties.
The property that PRACs ensure is perfect forward integrity: if a mobile agent visits a sequence of servers S = s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n , and the the rst malicious server is s c , then none of partial results generated at servers s i , where i < c , can be forged. This contrasts with a simple digital signature, where if an attacker compromises the generating host where the signature key is stored, the authenticity of all messages signed with that key becomes questionable. The use of a digital timestamping service [8] can have similar properties, except that in that case a trusted third party (the timestamping service) is required and the granularity of the timestamps limits the maximum rate of travel for the agents | the agent m ust stay on a server until the next timestamping epoch before migrating to the next server.
Simple MAC-based PRACs To h a v e an agent use simple PRACs, we provide the agent with a list of secret PRAC k eys at agent dispatch, with a key per server visited. Before leaving a server for the next, the agent summarizes its partial results from its stay at this server in a \message" back to the agent dispatcher. This message need not be sent back to the dispatcher immediately; instead, it may be carried with the agent as part of its migrating state for later transmission. This may be delayed so that it is \sent" to the dispatcher when the agent returns. Alternatively, these messages may be \batched" and sent when the networking bandwidth is cheap or available, e.g., when the dispatching mobile host has reconnected to the network. To provide integrity, a M A C is computed on this message, using the key associated with the current server; the message, along with its MAC, comprises the PRAC. The critical dierence between MACs and PRACs is that after a PRAC is computed, the agent takes care to erase the PRAC k ey associated with the current server prior to migrating to the next server. The erasure step provides a very important security property: the partial results from the honest prex servers can not be modied. (This contrasts with the honest sux property from section 3.3.1, where the partial results from honest servers visited after visiting the last malicious server are known to be unmodied.) Suppose an agent A traverses a sequence of servers S = s 1 ; s 2 ; : : : ; s n , where at each server s i a partial result PR i is computed using key k i , and servers s 1 ; : : : s j are honest and do not expose the internal state of the agent, then 8i; k : i j < k ; s k can not forge PR i , since s k must know k i to change PR i .
MAC-based PRACs with One-Way F unctions An obvious enhancement to simple PRACs is to use a single key instead of n PRAC k eys and use a m-bit to m-bit one-way function to generate the list of PRAC k eys. When the agent is initially sent to server s 1 , i t c o n tains key k 1 . When the agent prepares to go from server s i to server s i+1 , it computes k i+1 = f(k i ), where f is a one-way function, and erases all knowledge of k i . As before, a server s k can not forge PRACs from previous servers, since it would have to break the one-way assumption to determine the previous PRAC k eys or break the MAC function.
More generally, instead of a m-to-m-bit function, an m to r bit one-way function may be used. (Typically r < m .) In this case, to obtain k i+1 from k i , w e simply use some (perhaps pseudorandom) known (m r)-bit string t and set k i+1 = f(k i jt), where \j" denotes concatenation. If the probability that any algorithm, given y, will nd a pre-image x : f(x) = y is at most 2 m + , knowing the last (m r) bits of the pre-image x = k i jt should not help: if knowing t gives an algorithm a probability of nding a pre-image of p > 2 r + 2 m r , then by guessing the value of t values (probability 2 r m ), we obtain an algorithm which will nd a pre-image with probability 2 r m p > 2 m + , contradicting our one-way assumption.
Publicly Veriable PRACs The MAC-based PRACs above required that the agent originator maintained a secret key or keys in order to detect tampering with the partial results. An obvious question is whether perfect forward integrity can be provided such that the integrity v erication may be public | so that an untrusted intermediate server not sharing the secret key with the originator may nonetheless help detect tampering.
Like M A C-based PRACs, publicly veriable PRACs are implemented by relying on the destruction of information when agents migrate. Here, we use a digital signature system: when the agent is dispatched, it is given a list of secret signature functions sig 1 (m); : : : ; sig n (m), along with usregenerated certicates for their corresponding verication functions verif 1 (m; s); : : : ; v erif n (m; s).
The verication functions would be signed by the user's signature function sig user (m). 4 Like simple MAC-based PRACs, we use sig i (m) to sign the partial result computed on server s i , and erase sig i (m) prior to migrating to server s i+1 .
Similar to one-way function MAC-based PRACs, we can also defer key generation, so that most of it is done on the servers, which presumably have greater resources. Here, the agent i s g i v en
an initial secret signature function sig 1 (m) and a certied verication predicate verif 1 (m; s); the signature function is used both to sign partial results and to certify new verication functions.
The verication predicate verif 1 (m; s) (and its certicate) is public, and the signature function sig 1 (m) is secret. When the agent is ready to leave server s 1 , it signs the partial result r 1 by computing sig 1 (r 1 ). Next, it chooses (randomly) a new signature / verication function pair from the signature system, sig 2 (m) and verif 2 (m; s), and computes sig 1 (verif 2 ) to certify the new signature functions. Lastly, before the agent migrates to server s 2 , sig 1 is destroyed.
To use publicly veriable PRACs, the list of certied verication predicates must be either published and/or carried with the agent. When these predicates are available with the agent, publicly veriable PRACs enjoy an important property not available with MAC-based PRACs: while at server s j , the agent can itself verify the partial results obtained while at servers s i , where i < j . In particular, this means that computations that depend on previous partial results can detect any i n tegrity violation of those results | the agent's computation can abort early, instead of having to nish the computation and detecting integrity violation only when the agent results return to the agent originator.
Proof Verication
We w ould like to get a guarantee that the agent's computation was done according to program specied in the agent. One possibility is to forward the entire execution trace to the originator, who checks it. This however is too costly. W e w ould like to explore the use of holographic proof checking techniques [1] . This is quite a speculative idea. The current approaches are very theoretical. In principle they do help, but the cost in practice of existing solutions is prohibitive. We are considering investigating ways to use the ideas in a more practical way. Let us describe the ideas and issues to see what it is about.
Call the program x. Let y denote an execution trace. Dene the predicate (x; y) to be 1 if this trace is correct (corresponding to running x) and 0 otherwise. The server does not want to send y. But it can encode y as a holographic proof y 0 . This has the property that one needs to look at only a few bits of y 0 to check that (x; y) = 1. It is tempting from this to think that the server can just transmit a few bits. But this does not work. The model necessary for holographic proofs is that the verier have a v ailable a xed, \committed" proof string y 0 that he can access at will. He will pick a few random positions here and check something. So there is no choice but to transmit y 0 in entirety. W e will not save bandwidth. We will gain something: the verication process is faster.
(The verier receiving y 0 will perform some quick spot-checks).
A better approach is to use computationally sound (CS) proofs as in [12, 14] . Having constructed the holographic proof y 0 as above, the server hashes it down via a tree hashing scheme using a collision-resistant hash function h. Only the root of the tree is sent to the originator. This is relatively short, so bandwidth is saved. In addition, certain challenges are implicitly specied by applying an ideal hash function to this root, and the server also provides answers to them. The total communication from server to originator is still small compared to the length of the original execution trace y, y et some condence in the correctness of y is transmitted! The tree hashing is actually not impractical. What is prohibitive is constructing the holographic proof y 0 to which it is applied. This currently calls for application of NP-completeness techniques, including the use of the construction underlying Cook's theorem. What we might hope instead is to nd a direct holographic proof for the functions of interest, and then apply tree-hashing.
Trusted Environments Secure Coprocessors
An engineering solution to providing security for software agents is to build a trusted / trustworthy execution environment for the agents. The Sanctuary project will build such a n e n vironment to run within a secure coprocessor [20] , allowing Java-based agents to run securely; design and implement the agent APIs needed to support mobile Java agents; and develop the technology by which J a v abased agents can migrate among unmodied Java i n terpreters running in an secure-coprocessor environment.
In addition to the basic support for agent execution, the Sanctuary project will develop the trust framework needed for inter-server communications. This necessarily implies having some basic public key infrastructure | we should be able to leverage o of the existing work being done to support SSL [6] , PCT [3] , and TLS. 5 
Trust Models
The issue of trust models is very important to agent-based computing. Agents do not just need a trusted computing base (TCB) | trust may not be so binary in nature. Instead, agents (or their deployers) may decide that it is okay to run in a software-only environment if such a n e n vironment is hosted by a w ell-known and trusted entity, but the use of physical protection to maintain the trustworthiness of a trusted third-party provided execution environment is needed when the environment is hosted by a n e n tity with no reputation to protect and/or where no legal remedies may be obtained.
In Sanctuary, w e e n vision that the trust decision will be made by the agent's software itself. Thus, trust specication is simply an object in Java, and any eectively computable function may 5 The Internet Engineering Task Force's Transport Level Security group is developing a merged protocol based on SSL version 3 and features from PCT. Such a protocol requires a merchant-side public key infrastructure. be used. This is similar in spirit with the work of Blaze and Feigenbaum [5] , except that by unifying the agent language and the trust specication language, the programmer's work is simplied.
Mobile Java
Other approaches to providing mobility t o J a v a programs [18] requires modifying the interpreter. In Sanctuary, w e i n tend to provide a mechanism to migrate Java-based agents that can run on unmodied interpreters. This strategy will enable wider acceptance of mobile agents, leveraging o of the work done by Sun/Javasoft. 6 Proposed Work / Future Work The Sanctuary project group will examine the important security issues in mobile agent computing. This paper has discussed some preliminary results and directions.
The primary goal will be to build a secure agent e n vironment insofar as it is theoretically feasible. First, we will build a trusted Java agent e n vironment to run within a secure coprocessor and design APIs that permit agents to exist both in a hardware-based secure environment and in a software-only environment unchanged (but permitting security property queries). Next, we will build the necessary software tools to permit Java-based agents to be mobile. Our techniques will enable these agents to run on unmodied Java i n terpreters; this design approach permits greater acceptance of our work, since no complex installation process will be required, and it will allow our system to track new Java releases more easily. Additionally, w e will examine alternative methods for providing security for software agents through fault tolerance and cryptographic approaches (e.g., distributed function evaluation, additional uses of digital signature techniques, etc).
